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Abstract 
 
 
Two years ago Asia’s tiger economies were celebrating the Asian miracle, operating in an 
environment of relatively low inflation with a stable but cautious monetary policy. However, 
the rising wave of growth has suddenly turned into an Asian Tsunami. Rapid growth and 
prudent macroeconomic policies, therefore, do not guarantee a sustainable economic 
environment.  
 
This paper examines the characteristics of the current economic storm in Asia and the IMF 
relief effort, which has been labeled as antagonistic and ineffective in the salvaging of 
stricken Asian economies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For almost a decade, a phenomenal record of economic growth had been posted in the East Asian 
region. Countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines all achieved remarkable rates of growth, building high-quality 
manufacturing industries in a wide range of products, from clothes to computers. The region 
recorded GDP growth rates ranging from 10 percent in Singapore to 4.5 percent in Philippines 
(von Leffern and Cheng, 1998). In addition, these economies also attracted almost half of total 
private capital inflows to developing countries, totaling over $100 billion in 1996 alone. 
 
This environment, however, was not sustainable as most assumed it to be. The broader financial 
crisis first erupted in Thailand in July 1997 with a series of speculative attacks on the baht, 
triggering a wave of currency depreciation and stock market declines throughout Asia. After the 
second half of 1997, the currency values of South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, Malaysia 
had decreased by more than 40 percent while the Indonesian rupiah eroded by 70 percent. The 
stock markets of Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and Manila lost approximately US$370 
billion (63% of the four countries’ combined GDP). South Korea’s stock markets alone shed 
60% of its value.  
 
As the crisis built, it inflicted substantial macro shocks to financial institutions in the region, 
many of which were not prepared for a financial disturbance of this magnitude. What had 
originally been perceived as a ‘temporary adjusting process’ within the financial sector and one 
that would last only for a short period of time turned into something far more serious and 
pervasive.  Further, the turbulence in the financial markets has radiated further afield, and 
together with the ensuing acute recession in this part of the world, stands to drag down world 
economic growth, threatening to fuel an even wider crisis. This could generate a domino effect in 
the global financial markets.  
 
Investors badly affected by Asia’s wounded tiger economies and Russia’s ‘lumbering bear’ have 
withdrawn funds from Latin America to cover losses in other markets or headed to the safety 
nets of U.S and European bonds. The results have been damaging. Stock markets from Sao Paulo 
to Santiago have fallen to their lowest levels in years while the Mexican peso has fallen to a 
record low, down about 20 percent against the greenback to this date. Since then Columbia has 
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devalued its peso by 9 percent and Venezuela may follow suit (The Nations, September 1998).  
The Brazilian real depreciated by nearly 8 percent in a managed devaluation and threatens to 
trigger another crash in financial market confidence and set back Asia’s attempts at recovery 
(Guttsman, 1999).  The biggest concern is if the managed devaluation fails, this could potentially 
pull down the rest of the Latin America with it, as during the Mexico peso crisis in 1994. 
  
In response to the financial crisis and currencies plunges, crisis-hit countries like Thailand, 
Indonesia and South Korea (the world’s 11th largest economy), have had to turn to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for temporary bailouts. Even Japan, the world’s second 
largest economy after the United States, looks susceptible to the Asian Tsunami. The role of the 
IMF in these crisis-hit countries has drawn severe and at times uncontested criticism from critics 
such as economists, politicians and journalists, all of whom held their personal views on how the 
crisis should be resolved.  Instead of restoring financial confidence, the critics say the IMF 
prescription of high interest rates had dragged Asia into a deeper recession in the region.  
 
This paper examines the economic characteristics and the implosion of the Asian crisis, what the 
IMF has done to help contain it, and why the IMF prescribed bailout programs are being tagged 
as a failure to the impending crisis. The paper is divided into two sections.  Section 1 addresses 
the economic characteristics of the crisis with special emphasis on fixed exchange rate, large 
currency and maturity mismatches, fragility of the financial institutions, government-business 
relationships, investors-lenders delusion and the panic-driven withdrawal of funds.  Section 2 
examines the role of the IMF in the crisis and discusses whether IMF intervention has made the 
situation better or worse. The paper ends with a summary and brief conclusion. 
 
 
2. Economic Characteristics of the Asian Crisis 
 
Until the crisis erupted, the region’s economic success was attributed to its cultural values: a 
combination of a disciplined work ethic, conformity to principles of community and authority, 
and a tradition of a paternalistic outlook. These economies were achieving high growth rates in 
what was considered a stable economic environment, with relatively low inflation and outward-
oriented policy regimes. Since the 1980s, the introduction of export-oriented foreign direct 
investment in the region stimulated exports and imports growth. The economic fundamentals 
 3
were substantially strong as the region enjoyed high saving rates, relatively low inflation, and 
sound fiscal policy (Kawai, 1998). 
 
Why are these emerging tiger economies struggling with collapsing currencies and plunging 
stock markets, after so many years of outstanding economic growth and performance in a 
“disciplined market”?  The answer is essentially a game of “global arbitrage”, where funds move 
from one market to another, seeking profit opportunities from the imperfect financial global 
markets by taking advantage of interest-rate differentials and short-selling in stocks (Bello, 
1999).  A disciplined financial market does not guarantee stability and the market is not always 
right. 
 
 
3. Exchange Rate Stability 
 
Prior to the crisis, many Asian countries had generally adopted exchange rate policies that were 
either explicitly or implicitly pegged to the US dollar in order to ensure the stability of their 
nominal exchange rates relative to the US currency.  For example, the currency board in Hong 
Kong had its parity tied to that of the US dollar; the Thai baht was effectively fixed within a 
narrow band of 25.2 to 25.6 to the US dollar from 1990 to 1997; and the Malaysian ringgit 
moved within a restrictive range of 2.5 to 2.7 to the US dollar.  
 
However, this carried with it two negative consequences. Firstly, the appreciation of the dollar 
relative to most world currencies following spring 1995 inevitably caused a rapid real 
appreciation of the Asian currencies which were pegged to the dollar, affecting the 
competitiveness of these countries and resulting in a less sustainable current account deficit 
following favorable trade balances.  Using 1990 as the base year, Roubini (1998) reported that in 
early 1997 the real exchange rate had appreciated by 19% in Malaysia; 23% in the Philippines; 
12% in Thailand; 18% in Singapore; 8% in Indonesia; 30% in Hong Kong. The degree of 
currency overvaluation also correlated with worsening current account deficits. Table 1 shows 
that the Asian countries experiencing the crisis are those countries that have a large current 
account deficit relative to their GDP growth. For example, Thailand’s current account deficit was 
as high as about 8 percent of its GDP growth for two consecutive years. 
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This occurred while the currencies in countries such as Taiwan and China, which followed a 
more flexible exchange rate policy, experienced a real depreciation, and at a time when there was 
a fall in world export prices. The world prices for semi-conductors, an important export product 
for the crisis-hit countries, dropped 20% between 1995 and 1997 after rising sharply in the early 
1990s (Radelet and Sachs, 1999).  Competitiveness of this region was threatened by this decline 
and a significant slowdown in export growth was observed by 1996. 
 
Although a stable currency value assured a low exchange rate risk, favorable interest rate 
differentials attracted massive capital inflows; a situation which in itself partly caused the 
growing current account imbalances that were to come. Excessive capital inflow ended up in 
Thailand and South Korean commercial banks and non-bank institutions, and domestic corporate 
firms in Indonesia. This inflow of foreign capital was used to finance the consumption and 
investment boom in these countries. This was especially the case in non-tradeable sectors such as 
real estate projects, prestigious infrastructure projects and investments in speculative assets. This 
excessive accumulation of foreign liabilities by local financial institutions from the international 
capital markets fed a speculative asset bubble (in stock markets, land and real estate prices), 
which was not grounded in economic fundamentals.  
 
Further, most of these borrowings were short-term and their positions were left unhedged as 
firms and financial institutions expected the fixed exchange rate to be maintained. What followed 
were large maturity mismatches (using short-term bank loans to finance long-term projects), as 
well as big currency mismatches (borrowing short-term foreign currency liabilities to fund long-
term projects with uncertain cash flows and revenues denominated primarily in local currencies) 
as evidenced in Thailand. Consequently, given the volatility of short-term capital movements in 
international markets together with over-inflated domestic asset prices and deteriorating loan 
quality, the current account became vulnerable to short-term capital outflow and market 
contagion, resulting from reverse expectations and the resulting decrease in confidence (Meltzer, 
1998).  
 
Table 2 shows that net private capital flows into the five most affected economies, namely 
Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, leapt from $37.9 billion in 1994 
to $97.1 billion in 1996. However, by the second half of 1997, due to the very short-term 
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maturities of these capital flows, they were able to leave the crisis-hit countries quickly. Thus, 
these inflows reversed as net private capital flows turned to an outflow of $11.9 billion.  
 
 
4. Financial Supervision and Moral Hazard 
 
One major factor evidenced in this crisis was the lack of adequate resilience to a globalised 
environment while bringing about deregulation of financial markets and the liberalisation of 
capital accounts in the region (Kawai, 1998).  In addition, deregulation of financial markets at 
the national level has not been replaced by reregulation at the global level because finance 
capital has accumulated tremendous political influences over the last two decades (Bello, 1999).  
Thus there are certain institutional lessons and reforms that developing countries should learn 
from this and the earlier Latin American crisis before moving to full financial deregulation – 
particularly the need to keep the banking system under a strict discipline 
 
Unlike the crisis in Mexico in 1994 where the ‘tequila effect’ was the result of the difficulty for 
the Banco de Mexico to roll over the Mexican government’s excessive debt, the Asian crisis 
appears to be the result of fundamental weaknesses in the financial systems, masked by rapid 
growth fueled by private sector borrowings.  Chan-Lau and Chen (1998) argued that while a 
somewhat established banking infrastructure existed in the crisis-hit economies, there were high 
operating inefficiencies, and such systems had been shown to give rise to both ‘capital inflow 
inertia’ and a sudden large capital outflow.  
 
Financial sector liberalisation policies had been carried out in the crisis economies in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s, where stock and bond markets began to develop, new private banks 
mushroomed, and banks were given greater freedom in their lending decisions and raising funds 
offshore. This encouraged a significant buildup of offshore borrowings, which were financing 
the domestic investment and consumption boom.  
 
However, local governments’ capacity to regulate and monitor did not keep pace with the rapid 
financial sector liberalisation. There was failure on the part of domestic regulators to strike a 
balance between short-term systemic instability and long-term moral hazard: “for years, lenders 
and depositors felt too safe for their own good” (The Economist, January 10, 1998). To promote 
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safe lending in the long-term, a trade-off must be struck, involving guarantees of one kind or 
another to the depositors on the one hand and prudent regulations to discourage excessive risk-
taking on the other. In Thailand, for example, there was no effective mechanism or institutional 
structure in place to control the size and maturity of private debt and the lack of discipline led to 
private sector borrowings that greatly exceeded capital, a lack of consideration for exchange rate 
risks, too much short-term borrowing to finance long-term projects, and over-investment in 
sectors such as real estate and heavy industries (Sussangkarn, 1998).  The lack of good corporate 
governance practices and a sound bankruptcy law turned private borrowings into moral hazard 
problem. 
 
Ultimately, imprudent financial supervision, ineffective management of financial risk, and the 
maintenance of relatively fixed exchange rates led banks and corporations to borrow large 
amounts in foreign currencies, denominated in US dollars, marks, and yen – much of it short-
term – without hedging to finance long-term loans. For example, the foreign liabilities of banks 
in Thailand increased from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 28% of GDP in 1995; while bank claims on 
the private sector increased by more than 50% relative to GDP in just seven years in Thailand, 
Korea and Malaysia (Radelet and Sachs, 1999). When the slowdown in economic growth led to 
the deterioration of the quality of the financial institutions’ assets, net flows of foreign capital 
were curtailed.  Hence, when foreign loans were not renewed, the banks and corporations were 
consequently faced with large defaults (Meltzer, 1998).  
 
In addition, foreign lenders did not monitor the total assets and liabilities of the borrowers nor 
showed any concern about making short-term loans that financed long-term domestic loans. 
Government guarantees, either explicit or implicit, and the response of the IMF to bailout 
liabilities made foreign lenders feel safe, and therefore, not accountable for their failures. This 
further exacerbated the moral hazard problem: “ Some argue that the true cost of the costless 
Mexican bail-out is today’s crisis in Asia – because foreign lenders learned in 1995 that they 
would be rescued if their loans turned bad, therefore lent more than they should in Asia” (The 
Economist, January 10, 1998). Such guarantees hinder the governance of local financial 
institutions, increasing the incentive for unnecessary risk-taking, imprudent asset-liability 
management, fraud and undetected conflicts of interests. These guarantees also accelerate price 
inflation, reduce economic welfare, and weaken the financial system to near collapse.  
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5. Government-Business Relationship 
 
The crisis was also aggravated by issues of governance, notably government involvement in the 
private sector and the lack of transparency in the provision of financial and economic data. The 
Asian region is said to be permeated with practices of personalism that range from mutual 
obligation between employees and employers in Japanese firms to the corruption of government 
leaders in Indonesia. Thus, heavy reliance was placed on connections and personal guarantees by 
borrowers rather than on project viability evaluation or their proven credit worthiness; hence, the 
term ‘crony capitalism’. This was another source of the moral hazard dilemma, as creditors felt 
secure that they would be repaid for lending to companies with strong links to the government.   
 
This steady built-up of exposures of financial institutions - especially to real estate, infrastructure 
projects and stock markets, without due diligence to the ability of the borrowers to repay - 
invariably led to their vulnerability to economic downturn and any exogenous shocks, thereby 
generating excessive non-performing loans (NPLs). For example, the Thai government had 
allowed money to flood into building costly skyscrapers rather than investing in roads, 
telecommunications and education. The situation was worse in South Korea, where the entire 
economic system was based on the government encouraging banks to make cheap loans to 
conglomerates for continual expansion – regardless of world demand. A former executive of a 
South Korean bank rationalised the extension of credit to a steel company by asserting that steel 
was an important national industry. The steel firm subsequently went bankrupt.  Thailand and 
South Korea were thought to be heading in the right direction in terms of the IMF recommended 
reform agenda.  However, there is clear evidence of that chaebol restructuring, one of the IMF 
recommendations, has not materialized much and no meaningful improvement in key economic 
indicators in Thailand (The Bangkok Post, January 22, 1999). 
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6. Uncertainties 
 
The continuing economic weakness of Japan, the major economy in the region also did not help. 
Compared to the Mexico crisis in 1994, when the US, the regional economic power and its 
biggest export market, was in a strong cyclical upswing, Japan continued to experience economic 
recession. This kept their interest rate low and hence, the yen continued to depreciate against the 
US dollar, and this worsened the real appreciation caused by the other regional currencies. The 
condition of Japanese financial institutions, which hardly recovered from the burst of the asset 
bubble in the 1980’s and the recession of the 1990’s, worsened still further because they had also 
lent heavily to the regional economies.  The problems in the Japanese financial institutions will 
continue to have a negative impact as they withdraw credit from the region (The Bangkok Post, 
January 22, 1999). 
  
Financial problems faced by firms and financial institutions were also repeatedly discovered to 
be worse than initially reported – creating a level of uncertainty about the magnitude of the 
problems faced by these institutions. This uncertainty reinforced the worsening financial 
conditions and validated further weakening of the currencies. 
 
Another uncertainty is the immediate threat that China could devalue its yuan if its 8 percent 
economic growth is not sustainable under current conditions and is masking the fact that price 
deflation has intensified (Guttsman, 1999).  There is an underlying fear that China will resort to 
devaluing the yuan in an attempt to increase export competitiveness with its neighboring crisis-
hit countries 
 
The gravity of the crisis has been worsened by the ensuing political uncertainty in the region.  
Examples include the student unrests and racial riots which continued even after the collapse of 
President Suharto’s regime in Indonesia, governmental weaknesses in Thailand, and the highly 
controversial dismissal of Malaysia’s once heir to Prime Minister Mahathir.  These events 
generated a lack of confidence among foreign investors (delaying a much-needed capital inflow 
into this region).  
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7. Herd Behaviour 
 
Another significant characteristic of this crisis, one that is arguably the prevalent factor in 
explaining the contagion crisis effect, is the self-fulfilling herd behaviour of market participants. 
For example, risk spreads on emerging market debt were very narrow in early 1997 but were 
huge following the collapse of the Russian economy. This observation points to a lack of 
differentiation among borrowers as well as a swing in collective sentiment which was out of line 
with changes in the underlying prospects of countries hit by the crisis (Mann, 1999).  
 
During the turbulent 1920s, a French economist, Albert Aftalion, introduced a psychological 
theory of foreign exchanges – one that held that exchange rates were dominated by sentiment, 
more so than by long-term economic fundamentals. The continued support of an exchange rate, 
by drawing down reserves to satisfy the private sector’s excess demand for foreign exchange, 
could only invite speculative activities as market players anticipate currency devaluations. As a 
consequence, central banks would be forced to abandon their efforts to support the par value of 
their currencies more and more rapidly. In the Asian crisis, although most analysts initially did 
not place much emphasis on the panic-driven factor, it is now a more widely recognised 
contributor to the crisis (Krugman, 1999). The above characteristics, though explaining the 
vulnerabilities of the financial sectors in the pre-crisis economies, are short of rationalising the 
abruptness and the depth of the crisis, which affected so many countries simultaneously.  
 
 
8. The Roles of IMF in the Financial Crises 
 
Despite its continuous intervention as the financial architect in the Asian crisis, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) remains a puzzle on the international scene.  Some observers, confusing it 
with the World Bank or another aid institution, are under the impression that the IMF exists to 
subsidise economic development in the poorer nations.  To the crisis-hit countries IMF also 
implies different meanings: in Indonesia "IMF" means "Inject More Funds", in Thailand it 
means, "I'M Fired", and in Malaysia it means "International Monetary Fiasco" (Luther, 1998).  
Still others view the IMF as an institution of great authority and independence which decides the 
best economic policies for its members to comply with (Driscoll, 1998). 
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The IMF is neither a development bank, nor a world central bank, nor an agency that can or 
wishes to compel its members to do exactly what they are told.  It is rather a cooperative 
institution that 182 countries have voluntarily joined because they see the advantage of 
consulting with one another in this forum to maintain a stable system of buying and selling their 
currencies so that transactions of foreign payments in foreign money can take place between 
countries smoothly and without delay (Driscoll, 1998).  The IMF is also able to advise on 
monetary and fiscal policy, banking and financial reform and other structural reforms. 
 
The IMF encourages all members to pursue sound economic policies and to foster liberalised 
trade and investment.  It seeks to prevent economic crises by monitoring closely member 
countries' economy and warning them when trouble threatens.  When a crisis does strike, the 
IMF has been willing to act in accordance with its purposes to deal with major problems 
confronting the international economy.  For example, during the energy crisis in 1973-74, the 
IMF established a mechanism for recycling the surpluses of oil exporters and helping to finance 
the oil-related deficits of other countries. In 1994-95, the IMF intervened to help prevent 
Mexico's financial collapse - and to prevent the crisis from spilling over into other markets, 
which could have forced other countries to resort to exchange controls and debt moratoria, and 
might have caused a dramatic disruption in private capital flows to developing countries 
(Driscoll, 1998). 
 
As the crisis erupted in Asia, the IMF became almost a household name overnight.  It is playing 
the roll of a doctor to Asia illnesses.  Over US$100 billion has been committed to the region 
under the IMF endorsement bailout program since the crises began.  However, its role in Asia 
and more broadly in the world economy is not widely understood.  A main responsibility of IMF 
is safeguarding the stability of the international monetary system.  Thus the key role for the IMF 
in resolving the Asian financial crisis was to help restore confidence to the economies affected 
by the crisis with a mixture of massive loans and strict policy recommendations to go with them 
(Driscoll, 1998). 
 
Since financial weaknesses were a central cause of the crisis, the major recommendations of the 
IMF bailout programs have been comprehensive reforms that embrace a number of elements that 
are vital for economic growth and financial stability.  The reforms called for the closure of 
insolvent and unsound financial institutions, the recapitalisation of undercapitalised institutions, 
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close supervision of weak financial institutions, increased foreign participation in domestic 
financial systems and higher and more cost-effective spending on primary health care and 
education, and adequate social protection of the poor, the unemployed, and other vulnerable 
groups and environmental protection (Driscoll, 1998; IMF, 1998; Feldstein, 1998; Meltzer, 
1998). 
 
To address the governance issues, greater transparency and accountability in government and 
corporate affairs are needed both as regards economic data (on external reserves and liabilities in 
particular) and in the fiscal and corporate sectors, as well as in the banking sector (Driscoll, 
1998; Feldstein, 1998).  In addition, the bailout program advocates stronger banking system that 
protect the savings of small depositors and that must be freed from government intervention in 
the allocation of credit so that they will not be funnelled just to a favoured few, but to those who 
will use it productively.  All of these reforms will require a vast change in domestic business 
practices, corporate culture, and government behaviour. 
 
 
9. Did the IMF Make It Worse? 
 
Whether or not the Asia crisis turns out to involve a full-scale contagion effect, one question 
about the IMF bailout packages remains: did the IMF prescribe the right dosage of medicine or 
did it make the situation worse?  Many critics, particularly from the Asian region have asserted 
that the IMF's current resolution on major structural reforms has tightened economic conditions 
to the point of strangulation, threatening to kill or paralyse the patient.  They argue that the IMF 
should not have told countries to raise interest rates, or at least not by as much.  Higher interest 
rates have certainly slowed the economies down, threatening some healthy companies and 
causing financial distress.  For example, in South Korea, the IMF hoped to see interest rates 
doubled to more than 15 percent (Oxfam, 1998; IMF, 1998).  This led to the collapse of (or at 
least crippled) many companies, resulting in lost of production and increasing unemployment. 
 
The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Dr. Seri Mahathir Mohammad criticised IMF's tight 
monetary policies through high interest rates that choked and hindered economic recovery of the 
affected countries.  High interest rates compensate the holders of debt instruments for country 
risk but may force borrowers into bankruptcy and are likely to suffocate investment (Weber, 
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1998).  Thailand recently raised questions over whether prescriptions commissioned by IMF may 
be the right medicine for the ailing economy, and asked for more flexibility in response to 
changing circumstances.  Such repercussions reflect growing disillusionment and 
disenchantment among affected countries with the IMF prescriptions. 
 
The Asian crisis represents new challenges and a sense of confrontation to the IMF.  Because in 
recent years, the IMF has focused its attentions on the poor in Africa; those making transition 
from communism (mostly in Eastern Europe) and those wobbling under the foreign debts of bad 
governments policies (mostly in Latin American)  (The Economist, December 13, 1997), the 
IMF may underestimated the depth of and risks involved in the Asian crisis and probably did not 
anticipate the kind of blow-out that followed (IMF, 1998).  Insufficient background analysis has 
been paid to the specific problems and issues in the Asian countries, so that the IMF 
concentrated on disciplining countries (as it had during the Latin America crisis of the 1980s) 
when it should have concentrated instead reassuring stability in financial markets.  Massive 
deflation, increased interest rates and cuts in government spending were not only inappropriate, 
given the underlying economic conditions of the region, (in contrast to the 1980s Latin American 
crises, for example, most of the countries in the region have a high level of savings and a stable 
and cautious monetary policy, Oxfam, 1998), but also threatened to turn the regional recession 
into a full blown depression.  
 
The use of IMF assistance to bail out a country in financial and currency trouble is considered by 
some to be a threat to the stability of the world financial system (Calomiris, 1998; Vasquez, 
1998). The loans were given by the IMF and the foreign government at subsidised interest rates.  
However, the loss in terms of subsidised rates that are paid by the taxpayers in the U.S. and other 
developed countries is less than the loss borne by the taxpayers in the recipient countries.  In 
most cases, the IMF and U.S. treasury are repaid.  The loans however, provide strong 
justification for the increased taxes.  The risk takers, who are wealthy and politically powerful, 
therefore gain at the expense general taxpayers. 
 
Without government or IMF bailouts, both the creditors and debtors would renegotiate the debts 
or enter into bankruptcy procedure if they were illiquid or insolvent.  As both the creditors and 
debtors predict that they are able to claim the public resource to bail themselves out, they lack 
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the incentive to minimise loss.  Therefore, bailouts undermine the underlying concept of the 
laissez faire system pioneered by Adam Smith (Vasquez, 1998). 
 
Thus, perhaps the IMF was short-sighted in not recognising the compounding moral hazard 
issues after the 1994-1995 Mexican bailout.  Without IMF patronage, Mexico would have 
learned to implement better policies, would have fewer debts and would have made more 
progress.  Government and business in many countries continue to assume excessive risk; 
international support for bank bailouts will only accelerate the risk-taking and bring instability to 
the financial system.  The IMF intervention in the Asian crisis reinforced this moral hazard 
situation, allowing international banks to avoid the risks they undertake by imprudent lending 
(Meltzer, 1998).  To prevent an even larger future financial crisis, the IMF should not subsidise 
nor insulate borrowers but instead charge a severe penalty and require healthy collateral.  This 
will reduce financial risk and encourage safety and solvency of financial institutions. 
 
The IMF is not a charitable organisation and has limited financial capital as well as limited 
political capital.  It is not an institution set up as a full-scale lender of last resort; nor can it offer 
an open-ended credit line to liquidity constrained countries.  The IMF has no political authority 
over the domestic economic policies of its members.  It does not force its members to clean up 
the mess they have created. It can only recommend members to make the best use of scarce 
resources by refraining from unproductive military expenditures or by carefully targeting its 
spending on health, welfare programs and education.  The provision of IMF funds should not 
reward careless lending and excessive risk taking by any member country nor should it assume 
the bad debts of any member country. 
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10. IMF Admits Mistakes in the Economic Stimulus Package to 
Crisis-Hit Countries 
 
The IMF rescue programmes involve consolidating crisis-hit countries international debts and, 
lending fresh money in order for all debts to be repaid.  Without the IMF help, these countries 
would have to declare a moratorium on their debts.  However, the IMF rescue programme has 
been blamed for the recession and social crisis in countries such as Thailand, Indonesia and 
South Korea.  It is accused of neglecting structural problems while placing too much emphasis 
on fiscal and monetary policies.  The programme assumed similarity between the Asian crisis 
and the Mexico Tequila Effect, although the latter was limited to one country without any 
contagion effects.  The IMF did not expect the Asian crisis to expand into a full regional crisis.  
Some critics argued that the IMF should have left the markets alone and more banks would have 
failed, more international lenders would have taken losses but currencies would have suffered 
less. 
 
Hubert Neiss, the IMF director for Asia and the Pacific admitted that the IMF bailout program 
had underestimated the severity of the contagion from the crisis dragging Asia into a deeper 
recession.  However, he defended the policy of high interest rate in order to slow down further 
competitive devaluations of the Thailand, South Koran and Indonesia currencies that would have 
deepened the crisis.  The policy is unavoidable and put added stress on banking institutions and 
private enterprises.  A lower interest rate regime would have led to the weakening of financial 
institutions.  However, a prolonged high interest rate policy was not helpful especially for 
Thailand and Indonesia as tight credit measures enforced on banks reduced private investment.  
Without a tough austerity programme the potential risk of moral hazard would increase – the 
idea that crisis hit countries or investors act irresponsibly because they know someone will bail 
them out. 
 
The IMF prescribed policy of high interest rates did not take into account unemployment and its 
social consequences in the affected countries.  For example, IMF prescribed a US$17.2 billion 
rescue package for Thailand in August 1997 requiring it to tighten both monetary and fiscal 
policies, which led to massive contraction and unemployment.  In addition, IMF recommended 
that Thailand raise the value-added tax from 7 to 10 percent, which led to price inflation and 
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affected the general public immensely.  In Indonesia the rescue package required the Indonesian 
government to end food and oil subsidies, which trigged social unrest in the country.   Critics 
argue that IMF placed too much emphasis on monetary and fiscal restraints without much 
flexibility on the bailout package to crisis-ridden countries, which results in an overkill of 
economic activity.  The IMF has recently revised its restrictive prescribed policy to allow 
Thailand to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy, to allow subsidies on food and oil in Indonesia 
and fiscal expansionary programme in South Korea to address massive unemployment problems.  
However, the question remains as to whether such new dose of treatments will speed up the 
recovery process?  
 
 
11. Conclusions 
 
There is nothing new about lenders imposing conditions on borrowers.  Lenders usually impose 
conditions on borrowers to reduce the probability of defaults.  Likewise IMF loans are not grants 
and have to be repaid with interests.  Thus better crisis management programmes are needed in 
future in dealing with financial crises of this magnitude. .  International focus should be on long-
term responses to the crisis in achieving sustainable development and priority should be given to 
measures addressing deficiencies in the institutional and legal framework of the financial sector.  
Past experiences from the Latin American debt crisis should not be used as a template because 
every case is different.  Social policies should not be isolated from economic considerations.  
The social impact of the crisis has been the dominating deficiency in the IMF rescue programme. 
 
The role of IMF in muscling crisis-hit countries in Asia may diminish as it faces dwindling 
amounts of funds available for rescue programmes.  The ability of the IMF to steer the reform 
strategies as they see fit will begin to diminish and the leverage with other countries will reduce 
also.  This creates concerns among the broader international community on the substantial 
economic, political and social reforms agenda some crisis-hit countries still have to implement, 
for example, the banking reform in Indonesia, the enactment of bankruptcy proceedings in 
Thailand and the reform of South Korea’s chaebol.  These reforms will not be completed by the 
time the fund runs out. The Russian crisis provides the best example of a country where reform 
stopped after absorbing some US$4.8 billion of IMF funds.  It devalued the ruble and defaulted 
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on its debt.  The question remains as to whether market discipline is capable of replacing IMF 
discipline 
 
Some critics argued that the markets appreciate having IMF involvement in bailing out crisis-hit 
countries but markets won’t necessary be upset if the government of these countries assume full 
accountability to the IMF reform agenda.  For example, the Thailand and South Korea 
governments are very much reform-minded and need to confront domestic political challenges in 
their own ways.  Both countries understand the need to total commitment to reform backed up by 
measurable results as prerequisites for winning back investors.  Nevertheless, the region is 
unlikely to recapture its 1990s growth vitality until the Japanese economy is healthy because 
Japan accounts for about 70 percent of production in Asia.  Perhaps, therefore, the IMF should 
revisit its role in the era of abrupt capital movements and turn from a crisis fighter into a crisis 
prevention agency, because political systems are national while financial markets are global. 
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Table 1 
Asian Economic Indicators 
 
 Devaluation 
(% 1997) 
FX Reserves 
($ Billion) 
Current A/C 
($ Billion 
1996) 
Foreign 
Debt 
($ Billion) 
GNP 
Growth 
($ as of) 
China     0.0 134     7.2 110.0 9.0 (97) 
Hong Kong     0.2     92    (2.6)   N.A -6.4 (97) 
Indonesia* 129.0    19    (7.9) 133.0 8.0 (96) 
Japan   12.7  227  87.6 700.0 1.0 (96) 
Malaysia   53.7    24   (4.4)   27.0 7.4 (97) 
Philippines*   52.3       9   (3.8)   59.0 4.9 (97) 
Singapore   20.2    74  14.0     0.0 7.6 (97) 
South 
Korea* 
101.0    24 (13.3) 160.0 6.3 (97) 
Taiwan   18.0    83 9.3   62.0 6.9 (97) 
Thailand   81.7    30 (10) 102.0 6.7 (96) 
*IMF program 
 N.A. (not available) 
 
 Source:  von Leffern, E., and Cheng, K.Y. 1998,  'The Asian Economic Crisis: Causes and 
Impact', The Journal of Lending and Credit Risk Management, Vol. 80, No. 7, March, 
pp.50-6. 
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Table 2 
Five Asian Economies: External Financing 
 
 1994 1996 1997e 1998f 
Current account balance -24.5 -55.2 -27.1 30.6 
External financing, net 45.2 95.2 18.1 25.9 
Private flows, net 37.9 97.1 -11.9 -0.3 
   Equity investment 12.1 18.7 2.1 16.4 
        Direct equity 4.7 6.3 6.4 6.9 
        Portfolio equity 7.4 12.4 -4.3 9.5 
Private Creditors 25.8 78.4 -14.0 -16.8 
        Commercial banks 23.4 55.7 -26.9 -19.8 
        Non-bank private creditors 2.4 22.7 12.9 3.0 
Official flows, net 7.3 -1.9 30.0 26.2 
Resident lending/other, net** -15.2 -21.6 -30.5 -4.6 
Reserves excl. gold (- = increase) -5.4 -18.4 39.5 -51.9 
e = estimate, f = IIF forecast 
The five countries are South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
**including resident net lending, monetary gold, and errors and omissions. 
 
Source:  Institute for International Finance, Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies, 30 April 
1998. 
 
 
